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**LIBYA:****Firefight in Tripoli**

***The small group of dissidents crushed by Libyan security forces in Tripoli yesterday were apparently engaged in an operation against Qadhafi's headquarters there.*** [REDACTED]

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According to press reports, about 15 commandos fought a running battle with Libyan security forces for several hours before being overcome by Libyan troops supported by armored vehicles. Libya claimed that the commandos were pro-Arafat Palestinians infiltrated from Tunisia and Libyans trained in the UK and Sudan. The French press reported that by yesterday afternoon Tripoli was calm and Qadhafi was unharmed. [REDACTED]

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**Comment:** The commandos probably were exiles hoping to capitalize on recent domestic unrest in Libya and on Qadhafi's damaged reputation following the shooting incident in London. They may have intended to assassinate Qadhafi or bomb his headquarters and perhaps expected to spark a military or civil uprising. It is not clear whether they actually mounted an attack on Qadhafi's headquarters [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] In any event, such a small group would have had virtually no chance of success against Qadhafi's heavily protected compound. [REDACTED]

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The action—one of the boldest inside Libya by an exile group—could cause Qadhafi to reverse his recent decision to halt attacks on his opponents abroad. He probably will at a minimum launch a diplomatic and media campaign declaring that Washington and London were involved. Moreover, he could charge Tunisia with complicity by allowing the infiltration of the exiles. [REDACTED]

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**USSR-US:****Nonparticipation in the Olympics**

***Moscow's decision not to participate in the summer Olympics in Los Angeles is intended to dramatize its dissatisfaction with the state of US-Soviet relations, primarily in order to increase domestic and international pressure on the US Government for more conciliatory policies.***

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The TASS announcement of the decision focuses on security issues, charging "connivance" by US authorities in the activity of extremist groups and claiming that anti-Soviet "hysteria" is being generated in the US. More generally, the statement accuses the US of violating the spirit of the Olympic Charter. It said that in these conditions the participation of Soviet athletes is impossible and that to act differently would be tantamount to approving the "anti-Olympian" actions of US authorities and the games' organizers.

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**Comment:** Moscow was almost certainly concerned both about security and about opportunities for defection among its athletes. The action, however, was taken for maximum political effect. Along with suspension of the Geneva talks on limiting nuclear weapons, the Soviet decision marks a departure from Moscow's approach to bilateral relations for over a decade, when the USSR was reluctant to disrupt such highly visible contacts.

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Following General Secretary Chernenko's statement last week indicating that US efforts to improve the relationship are inadequate, the action suggests a Politburo consensus that only unprecedented toughness on Moscow's part will evoke a moderation of US policies.

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The Soviets probably calculate that, by underscoring tensions between the two superpowers, they can bring greater international and domestic pressure on the US to moderate policies particularly objectionable to them. The decision is likely to be unpopular with many Soviets and with Moscow's East European allies, especially the East Germans, who, nevertheless, probably will feel compelled to follow the Soviet example. The TASS announcement leaves little or no room for reversal.

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**USSR-CUBA-  
NICARAGUA:****Possibility of MIG Deliveries**

***Nicaragua reportedly is pushing to complete a new military airfield and a deepwater Caribbean port by October, possibly in anticipation of new Soviet deliveries that may include MIG fighters.***

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the Nicaraguan Air Force's command staff expects MIGs to be delivered from Cuba when the new airfield at Punta Huete is complete. The airfield reportedly is to be finished in October.

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the Cubans are working feverishly to make the airfield operational by then.

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Nicaraguan and Bulgarian

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construction officials at El Bluff say that that Caribbean port has to be ready to receive Soviet shipping by October. Soviet vessels previously have delivered military support equipment to Nicaragua's Pacific ports. Bulgarian ships have unloaded tanks and other heavy arms offshore from El Bluff for transshipment up river to Rama, where port facilities recently have been improved.

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The US warning not to provide Nicaragua with modern jet fighters and the US action in Grenada, combined with Soviet reluctance to challenge the US militarily in Central America, probably account for Moscow's and Havana's hesitation to deliver the planes. Nonetheless, the Soviets and Cubans apparently want the ability to send the MIGs if they chose to increase the level of tensions in Central America on short notice.

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**IRAQ-IRAN:****Another Attack on Shipping**

***Iraq's attack on an oil tanker on Monday night probably will not influence the spot market price for crude oil.*** [redacted]

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A 117,000-ton Saudi tanker was hit and abandoned about 90 nautical miles south of Khark Island, where it had just been loaded. The US Embassy in Kuwait says the tanker's cargo has not spilled or burned. US AWACS aircraft detected two Iraqi aircraft near the tanker the night of the strike. [redacted]

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Last week, Iraqi President Saddam Husayn said that Iraq would soon be able to increase its attacks on shipping. [redacted]

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**Comment:** Baghdad hopes its attacks on oil tankers will deprive Iran of the revenues it needs to continue the fighting. Iraq also is lobbying major arms suppliers to stop shipments to Iran. The Iraqis believe that Tehran will be forced to negotiate if it cannot make progress on the battlefield and is deprived of arms and money. Iraq probably will intensify its attacks on shipping when the Exocet-armed Mirage aircraft become combat ready this summer. [redacted]

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This is the fourth tanker to be attacked since 27 March. Insurers have raised insurance rates 0.5 percent to 2 percent for tankers calling at Khark Island. Freight rates have risen moderately since the last Saudi ship was hit on 25 April. [redacted]

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As long as the Iraqi attacks do not significantly inhibit tanker operators from calling at Khark, Iran is unlikely to retaliate openly against Arab Gulf states, although it may put political pressure on states like Kuwait. [redacted]

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To entice shippers, Iran may discount oil prices. It already is offering insurance to cover damage inflicted in Iraqi attacks. Iran will also try harder to intercept Iraqi aircraft over the Gulf and may try to interfere with shipping for Iraq. [redacted]

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**USSR-VIETNAM: Concern About Relations**

A high-level Soviet diplomat [redacted] recently stated that Moscow is worried about its relations with Hanoi following President Reagan's trip to China. He expressed concern that improved Sino-US ties would encourage the Chinese to put more pressure on Hanoi, which in turn would increase its demands on the USSR. [redacted]

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**Comment:** The Soviet's comments seem to reflect informed personal views rather than an official line. The principal source of friction in the Soviet relationship with Vietnam currently appears to be the Sino-Soviet dialogue, not Sino-US relations. China's increased pressure on Vietnam probably will cause more problems for Moscow in its relations with Hanoi, particularly if—as now appears likely—Beijing is intent on teaching Hanoi its harshest "lesson" since 1979. Depending on China's actions, the Soviets could soon be faced with difficult decisions on whether to cancel First Deputy Premier Arkhipov's China trip and whether to respond to possible Vietnamese calls for Soviet military support. [redacted]

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**GREECE: Military Leaves Canceled**

[redacted] the Greeks have canceled all military leave between 19 May and 17 June. [redacted] the measure is in connection with the election for the European Parliament on 17 June and specifically says the order has nothing to do with any threat from Turkey. [redacted]

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**Comment:** Although the Greeks have canceled military leaves during elections before, troops were normally confined to barracks for only a few days before and after an election. The extension of this period to a month conceivably may be related to the situation on Cyprus or to the state of relations between Greece and Turkey. Prime Minister Papandreou's view of the election as a national referendum reflects his increasing sense of vulnerability amid growing tensions at home. [redacted]

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**NETHERLANDS: New INF Basing Proposal**

The Liberals' suggested compromise for deployment of US cruise missiles in the Netherlands is a response to Prime Minister Lubbers' invitation for proposals to break the current impasse and preserve the center-right coalition. The Liberals would accept full deployment of the 48 cruise missiles allotted to the Netherlands but would renew basing approval every four years. Under NATO plans, the first missiles are to arrive in the Netherlands in late 1986. [REDACTED]

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**Comment:** Lubbers decided to postpone a basing decision until June after his party—the Christian Democratic Appeal—was unable to resolve internal differences on the INF issue. The Liberals are the junior and more conservative partner in the government coalition. Although their proposal would be likely to satisfy the NATO Allies, the cabinet probably will not pursue it because Lubbers' own party and the opposition parties almost certainly will oppose it. [REDACTED]

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**TUNISIA: Campus Unrest**

The heavyhanded use of force by security units at Tunis University has heightened opposition to the government. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] The students were protesting the scheduled appearance on campus of Minister of Family and Women's Advancement Fathia Mzali, the wife of Prime Minister Mzali. University professors went on strike last week to protest the government's handling of the incident. [REDACTED]

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**Comment:** The incident will further weaken support for Prime Minister Mzali, which already was damaged by the bread riots last January. Mzali's political decline almost certainly will encourage further challenges by the radicals, who have been restrained by more pragmatic fundamentalist leaders. Although the spontaneity of the incident probably rules out direct Libyan involvement, Tripoli may be urging Tunisian extremists to exploit the growing unrest. [REDACTED]

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**OMAN: Military Exercise Completed**

Oman recently concluded a weeklong exercise simulating the reinforcement of the Musandam Peninsula on the Strait of Hormuz. [redacted] the exercise involved airlifting infantry units to the peninsula while amphibious forces escorted by warships provided logistic support. [redacted]

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**Comment:** Such exercises are strengthening Oman's capability to reinforce and support its garrison on the peninsula to defend against an Iranian attack. Its greatest weakness, however, remains its inability to provide sufficient air support over the peninsula from bases that are farther away from the strait than Iran's. [redacted]

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**DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Crackdown Continues**

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The arrest of more than 100 members of opposition groups last weekend and of two labor leaders on Monday probably were designed to head off a general strike and more demonstrations. [redacted] military units have been put on alert in anticipation of a general strike today. [redacted]

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**Comment:** President Jorge Blanco has maintained control so far by using tough tactics to intimidate the opposition. He continues to be aided by the inability of opposition elements to decide on a common approach. The Popular Struggle Committees are a new feature in domestic politics. They consist largely of the unemployed and apparently are not controlled by any of the established political parties. [redacted]

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**In Brief****Middle East**

... could include Tornado jet fighters, Hawk jet trainers, and hand-held surface-to-air missiles ... reflects Saudi disenchantment with US policies and desire to broaden source of supply.

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**USSR**

— **French** President Mitterrand criticizing upsurge in the number of **Polish** political prisoners and promising a high-level protest ... may be designed to stress his impending visit to Moscow will not produce softening of position on human rights.

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— Three-day congress of ruling **West German** Christian Democratic Union begins today ... almost certainly will show unified support for government security and foreign policies.

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**Americas**

— Censorship partially lifted in **Suriname** last week, but private media still operating under tough restrictions ... new policy a compromise between moderate Prime Minister Udenhout and Army Commander Bouterse's leftist advisers.

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**Special Analysis****SOUTH AFRICA:****New Maneuvering in Regional Diplomacy**

***South Africa is showing increased confidence following the signing of the nonaggression pact with Mozambique in March. Pursuing an ambitious diplomatic agenda, Pretoria has intensified pressure on its other neighbors to agree to formal security pacts. Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland have been targets of South African pressure to agree to such pacts, even though in the past they have placated Pretoria on security issues. On the Namibian question, the South Africans are exploring the possibility of arranging a regional settlement outside the UN framework.***

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To compel Botswana to accede to a security agreement, Pretoria warned that it would encourage domestic opposition to the government in Masire if it refused to accept the South African draft. It also reminded Botswana of its vulnerability to South African economic pressure.

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South Africa has put Lesotho on notice that it could use economic leverage to force greater cooperation on security issues.

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Swaziland has signed a nonaggression pact with South Africa and has actively restricted the ANC, but Pretoria is demanding it do more.

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Several Swazi police and ANC guerrillas have recently died in shootouts in Swaziland, according to press and US Embassy reporting.

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On the other hand, South Africa is rewarding Mozambique, which has taken vigorous action against ANC military cadre since signing the Nonaggression Pact. Pretoria in the past month has provided drought relief assistance and has agreed to pay higher prices for the electric power it buys. It also has expedited contacts between private South African investors and Maputo government in addition to appealing for Western aid on Mozambique's behalf.

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**Pretoria's Namibian Gambit**

Although South Africa has publicly and privately reaffirmed its commitment to the UN plan for Namibian independence, there are signs that some leaders in Pretoria prefer a regional solution if the US cannot arrange a Cuban withdrawal. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

Some South Africans apparently believe that SWAPO can be maneuvered into joining a coalition government. They undoubtedly believe that SWAPO President Nujoma is vulnerable as a result of the Angolan-South African disengagement agreement, which requires Luanda to prevent SWAPO infiltration into Namibia. [REDACTED]

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Pretoria recently released several SWAPO political prisoners, including the movement's founder, Toivo ja Toivo, who is a potential challenger of Nujoma for the leadership of the organization. This probably was intended to undercut Nujoma and to strengthen the prestige of the Multi-Party Conference, which had appealed for the prisoners' release. [REDACTED]

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Representatives of SWAPO, the conference, and South Africa's administrator for Namibia are to meet in Lusaka on 11 May. Pretoria may see this as a step toward a regional settlement. [REDACTED]

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The Multi-Party Conference hopes to present SWAPO with a draft bill of rights that would serve as the basis for an accord between the two groups. Prime Minister Botha recently told Parliament his government would not stand in the way of such an agreement. [REDACTED]

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SWAPO and the Frontline States, however, are wary of South Africa's intentions. SWAPO has publicly affirmed that it will only discuss ways to carry out the UN plan at the meeting in Lusaka and says it will not meet with the conference. Zambian President Kaunda told senior US diplomats last week that he could support only a UN solution to Namibia, but he probably would accede to any plan accepted by SWAPO. The Summit of Frontline States last week also reaffirmed its support for the UN plan. [REDACTED]

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### **Outlook**

South Africa clearly has the diplomatic initiative and is enjoying some success. It will continue its aggressive regional policy. The scheduled trip of Botha later this month to at least Zaire and several West European capitals will strengthen this confidence. It is the first trip to Western Europe by a South African head of government in seven years. [REDACTED]

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SWAPO is unlikely to accept Pretoria's proposed settlement now, but South Africa probably will continue to put military and diplomatic pressure on the group to end its insurgency. [REDACTED]

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